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The Polish stabilization program implemented in  stable. Large households, and children in particu-
1990 as part of the transition to capitalism  lar, were especially affected. The poverty gap
entailed unexpectedly high social costs.  rose from an estimated 1.4 percent of GDP to 4.8
percent.
The often unstated assumption had been that
since central planning was intrinsically ineffi-  Existing evldenct  on income distribution
cient, stabilization in Poland might be less costly  shows that it did not change. There was a slight
in terms of lost output than it would have been in  compression of income among farmers, which
a market economy. The idea was that recession  has also occurred in the past when real incomes
stemming from an overall decline in demand  declined, and possibly some wage-stretching
could be moderated by removing the administra-  among workers.
tive barriers that in a planned economy hindered
the best deplo) ment of resources.  What happened to the general welfare?
Conclusive results are elusive. Personal con-
The results were the reverse of expectations.  sumption, ove-rall,  decreased. Queuing also
Unemployment reached 12 percent of the labor  decreased, but utility gains from shorter lines
force by the end of 1991, and real incomes  were offset as real wages, and thus the opportu-
plummeted (by about 40 percent). An estimated  nity cost of waiting, declined. Real appreciation
17 percent of the population lived In poverty in  of the exchange rate raised dollar wages substan-
1989. By 1991, that figure reached 34 percent.  tially and led to an upsurge in consumer imports,
The poverty rate more than doubled for all social  thus increasing the utility derived from the
groups except pensioners, for which it remained  ownership of consumer durables.
The  Policy  ResearcbWorking  PaperSeries  disseminate  the findings  of work  underway  in  the BLnk.  An objectiveof  the series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully  polished. The  findings, interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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comments.Section I. Polish Stabilizatioli Program of 1990: Effect on Incomes
The implementation  of the Polish stabilization  program began on January 1, 1990. It was
the boldest stabilization  program implemented  in any socialist  country (defined  in the sense that
majority of assets outside agriculture is state-owned).  The program involved substantial  price
liberalization  with the cut in subsidies, incomes  policy (wage caps), conveitibiliiy  of the zloty,
introduction  of positive real interest rates, and the reduction  of the budget  &Aflcit.  Some  of these
measures  proved a success. Convertibility  at the fixed exchange  rate was maintained  throughout
ths year. Real interest rates, from being sharply negative  in 1989, became  positive. The budget
deficit equal to 7 percent of GDP in 1989 was turned into a small suiplus in 1990 (0.3 percent
of  GDP). Real amount of subsidies was cut by more than half. The inflation rate shaxply
decelerated from an average monthly rate of 19 percent in 1989 to 5 to 6 percent at the end of
1990.
On the negative side, one can include a sharp decrease in  real wages,'  substantial
increase in unemployment,  and a collapse of industrial production. Real state-sector wages in
1990 were some 30 percent lower than the year before (the initial forecast was -10 percent).
Unemployment  rose from practically nil ia the beginning  of 1991 to 1.2 million by the end of
the year (6.1 percent of the labor force). The increase was three times greater than originally
forecast (400,000). Finally, industrial  production of the state sector plummeted, decreasing  by
about 25 percent compared  to 1989. This was also a greater decline  than anticipated  (5 percent).
Even accounting for the increased output of the private sector, gross industrial value added in
1990 was 22 percent less than in 1989 while GDP v as 11.5 percent smaller (GDP per capita 12
percent).
The decline  in industrial  production  generated  a lively discussion  and produced  a number
of theories as to  why it was so dramatic, Wz. whether the slump was mostly due to external
causes (breakdown of the CMEA market) or  to  internal ones (monopoly stmcture of  the
industry). Some questioned  whether the decline was really of such a magnitude  since output in
the past was overstated  and calculated  at arbitrary (non-market)  prices (Lipton  and Sachs, 1990:
1  Unless  explicitly  stated  otherwise,  'real  always  refers  to 'non,jnjU  deflaWt  by the  official
consumer  price index.
178-9).
Winiecki (1991)  proposed the following argument. According  to Winiecld, two out of
the tbree components  of the registered output decline do not matter. One part of the decrease
is purely a statistical artifact due to the earlier practice of padding the output figures to show
fulfillment of plan targets. The second part of the decline is due to  behavioral changes of
enterprises  and, to some  extent, individuals.  For example, better availability  of goods, increased
interest rates, and somewhat  harder budget constraint, led entexprises  to reduce their stocks of
inventories  which  in socialist  economies  are inordiinately  high..  The drawing-down  of inventories
produced a short-run output decline, but in  reality it represented an adjustment to market
conditions.  Thus, the first component  is fictitious,  and the second,  while entailing  a real decline
in output, has no effect on population  welfare.  Only the third component  of output decline,
caused by stabilization,  is both real and does have an impact on welfare. Winiecki's argument
shows  that recorded  declines  are indeed  overestimates  of the actual ones, even if the break-down
of the three components  is impossible  to make. It should be noted however that the so-called
fictitious decline was probably very small in Poland because the scope of central planning in
Poland was fairly limited even before the 1989 change of regime. 2
The standard of living suffered  seriously  as a result of the stabilization.  Several "macro"
indicators show this decline: real average ivage in  the state sector (where 87 pertcint of
non-agricultural  labor was employed)  was reduced by 31 percent; unemployment  emerged; real
income of agricultural households  was cut in half as terms of trade moved sharply against
agriculture; and, finally, pensions  decreased  by 17 percent in real terms. lhe  unly real increase
was registered by private sector incomes: they went up by 33 percent in total while the number
of private sector non-agricultural  employees  increased 22 percent. Private sector share in total
non-agricultural  employment  was still small to make much difference overall. As a result, in
1990, real per capita consumption  dropped by 13.5 percent.
2  Government  contracts,  the only form of central  planing  that existed,  were  introduced  in
1982. By 1988, they covered  only about 6 percent of GDP and in 1989 they became  even further
scaled  down to include only some essential intermediate  goods and energy (see Rzemzrpospolita,
Economic  Reform  Supplement,  September  6, 1988). State investments  accounted  for only  2 percent
of GDP.
2In  1991, the situation stabilized in the sense that the decline in industrial production,
GDP, population  incomes, and state-sector  wages became  less or bottomed  out. GDP decreased
by a further 7.6 percent. Industrial  production of the state sector decreased by 13 percent. Real
wages in  the  state sector  stabilized at  their  1990 level. Private sector incomes (outside
agriculture)  still continued  to increase, by about 1 percent per capita. XJnemployment,  however,
continued to grow at almost the same pace as in  1990, reaching 2.3 million (11.8 percent of
labor force) by  the end of  1991. Several positive developments on  the mdcro side were
preserved: the inflation rate decelerated further to  an average monthly rate in  1991 of 4.1
percent, real positive interest rate policy was continued, and the budget  deficit, despite serious
pressure, was maintained  at less than 4 percent of GDP. However, recovery had not yet started
in 1991. The first signs of the recovery  in industrial  production (the series  that declined  the most
precipitously  at thte  inception  of the stabilization  program) were recorded only in the mid-1912.
These macro indicators were known to the authorities and analysts as the stabilization
program unfolded. What was not known was how these overall developments  were reflected  at
the household  level: who became  unemploye6;  how much did poverty increase  and among  what
social groups; did wage distribution among state-sector workers become more unequal as
entexprises  restructured  and tried to keep more productive  workers from moving  to the private
sector; did overall income  distribution  become  more skewed?  The objective  of the present  paper
is to tly to answer some of these questions  on the basis of the 1990 and 1991 data provided by
the regular Household budget surveys  published by the Polish Central Statistical  Office. 3 The
period of two years is sufficiently  long as to allow all the essential  effects of macro stabilization
and system change to "trickle down" to the level of .souseholds.
3  The data for 1990  and 1991  are published  in respectively  Budzety  Gospodartw Domowych
w 1990 RoIu and Budzety Gospodarstw  Domowych  w 1991 Rolc,  Warsaw: Central  Statistical
Office, 1991  and 1992.  The surveys  cover about 28,000  households  (0.25 percent of all households
in PolaA). The surveys  are representative  of about 88 percent of the population  (see Gorecki, 1992,
p. 4). They exclude non-agricultural  private sector, Army and police personnel.  Surveys  include
private sector workers only if the main earner is employed  in the state sector. They do not include
e.g. households  whose both members are employed  in the private sector, or whose one member is
unemployed  aud the other works in the private sector.  Non-inclusion  of private sector outside
agriculture  was n-t a major omission  in the past when this sector was small. It is a serious defect
now when the sector is growing. This shortcoming  is being coirected in 1992  survey.
3Section I.  Who Became Unemployed?
Polish stabilization  program of  January 1990 was followed by  a  swift increase in
unemploycntt.  As already mentioned, the percentage of the unemployed in non-agricultural
labor force increased in two years between January 1990 and Janm'ry 1992 from less than 1
percent to 12 percent. In absolute numbers, the increase was from less than 200,000 to 2.3
million. Net job loss in the state sector was 20 percent or about 1.6 million workers. 4 The
question  we address in this Section  is how the decline  in employment  was reflected  in the micro
(household-level)  data, and what types of households  were primarily affected by it.
The  Survey  provides  information  about  the  average  number  of  state-sector
non-agricultural  employees  by income group and by household  size. The number of state-sector
non-agricultural  employees declined between 1989 and 1991, as shown in Table 1, by 5.3
percent. The decrease was more significant  among  mixed households  (-8.2 percent) than among
workers' households  (-4.4 percent). This can be explained  by two factors:  (1) the tendency  to
fire first those with available outside work options (private agriculture in the case of mixed
households)  and/or (2) more prevalent voluntary quits among the mixed households  who, due
to  their experience  with private sector agriculture, may have greater confidence  in starting own
businesses.  Some evidence of (2) is provided by the fact that state sector employment  declined
the most among the well-off households. Although this is true for both workers' and mixed
households, it is more pronounced  in the case of the latter: the participation  in the state sector
of the top income class among  mixed households  decreased by almost 10 percent. Interestingly,
state-sector employment increased among the  lowest income groups.  Among pensioners
participation rates were low (only about 6 percent of people living in pensioners' households
were employed in  state sector) and while they increased (to 6.-  percent), their absolute
contribution  is minimal.
Decrease in employment  was the most severe among the "standard" household sizes
(four- and five-person households). The state-sector  participation rates for these households
decreased by between 4.7 and 6.4 percent for workers, and 8.6 and 12.3 percent for mixed
households.
4  Outside  agriculure.  See P.  Suttcal  Yearbook  1992, p. Xl.
4Table 1: Change in Non-Agricultural State-sector Employmant (in percent):
1991 vs. 1989
Income Classes  Workers  Mixed  All
First group  +4.7  |+2.9l
Second  +7.0  -6.9l ~~~~,  2,
Third  +4.4  -6.9
Fourth  -3.0  -2.7
Fifth  -2.9  -4.5
Sixth  -7.9  -3.1
Seventh  -6.4  -1.3
Eighth  -|-1.9  -9.4
Household  Size  X
2-person  -3.1  -0.9  l
3-person  -4.9  -8.4  l
4-person  -4.7  -8.6
5-person  -6.4  -12.3
6-person  _____  -3.4  -9.8
Total  -4.4  -8.2  -S.3
Note: The value gives the percent change in people employed iD state sector.
Income classes for  each year  are  not &-d  in real terms. They,  however, contain similar percentages of
recipients (the shape of income distribution curve is lognormal; see Figure 3).
Section mI.  What Happened to Poverty?
Real state sector wages in  1990 dropped by 31 percent and in  1991 by a further 3
percent; real pensions declined by 17 percent in 1990 and rose by 15 percent in 1991, thus
returning to their pre-stabilization  level. Farmers suffered the most: their real income was cut
by more than one-half in 1990, and by additional 36 percent in 1991. These are al  "macro"
data. How is the decline in real incomes reflected  in the household  data collected by Surveys?
5Poverty rates went up in all  social groups except pensioners (see Table 2 and Figutre 1).5
Among workers' households  the share of the poor incr- sed, between 1989 and 1991, from 16
to  38 percent. The bulk of the increase occurred in  1990. The poverty headcount among
workers' households remained broadly stable in  1991. Te  percentage of the poor among
farmers increased from 17 to almost 40 percent. For mixed ho'iseholds  which have throughout
the  1980 exhibited the  lowest Doverty rates,  the percentage of  the poor  also increased
substantially: from 8 to 21 percent. The universal increas; in poverty rates had, as Figure 1
makes clear, the effect of equalizing  poverty rates among different social groups. Thus, while
in the  1980's, the proportion of the poor among pensioners ftuctuated between 30 and 40
percent, and was only around 10 percent for the mixed households, 6 in 1991, the poverty rates
of pensioners,  workers, and farmers were very close. The poverty rate for the mixed  households
was also not far behind.
5  Poverty rates for different social grups  are calculated as follows. 'he  poverty line is
assumed  to be equal to the social minimum  line calculated  since 1980  by Ete  Institute of Labor and
Social  Affairs in Warsaw. The line is calculated  quarterly.  It is based  on a fixed  basked  of products.
For the year as a whole, we take the simple average of the quarterly amounts. The social minima
for one-person  workers' and pensioners'  households  (calculated  separatevy  by the Institute)  represent
the poverty  line for one male adult worker and pensioner.  For mixed  and farmers' households  this
amount  is lowered by 20 percent, on account  of lower prices in rural areas (the reduction  suggested
by the researchers in the Institute). The next step is to apply the poverty line to the income
distribution  statistics  derived from the Surveys. The  Surveys  provide  income distribution  data (eight
income clases  arranged  according  to household  per capia income)  for six types of hc zseholds  (from
1-person  to 6 and more person-households)  for workers, farmers and mixed  household; and thrde
types of households  for pensioners.  This gives a total  of 21 incone distributions,  or 21 x 8 income
classes =  168 observations.  For each observation,  the Surveys also provide the data on average
number of equivalent consumption  units. All individuals  belonging to a given income class are
considered  poor if the upper income limit of that class, adjusted for the number of equivalent
consumption  units, is less than the poverty  line. To give an example.  Let the poverty line  for 1  adult
be $10. Let now ten 3-member  households  have, on average.  2.2 adult  consumptionunits  and belong
to the income class that ranges  from $4 to $7 per capita. This  yields lower and upper income  limit
per adu  consmption unit of $5.45 and $9.54. We then  classify  all ten households  or 30 individuals
as poor because  the upper adjusted  income  limit ($9.54) is less thin the poverty  line ($10). Clearly,
if the lower adjusted  income limit is greater than the poverty line, none of the households  is poor;
if the poverty line is between  the two limits, a proportion of individuals  is considered  poor. The
poverty rates for social groups and the total poverty rate are then constructed  from the individual
21 poverty rates. The poverty gap is calculated  in a similar fashion.
F  For the exact data, see Milanovic  (1992).
6,eoverty  rates for different





W-vorkers  mrxed  Farmers  penslonels
able 2:  Povertv and Real Income:  Change
Between 1989 and 1991
Decrease in real  Poverty Rate in  Poverty Rate in
per capita income  '91  '89
Workers  33.3  38.1  15.8
Mixed Households  41.0  21.2  7.9
Farmers  51.6  39.4  17.2
Pensioners  11.6  33.0  36.2
Total  41.5  34.4  17.3
Note: Poverty  rae  is the headcount  index.
Another interesting  development  is that farmers now have the highest proportion of the
poor. This Gocurred  as farmers' terms of trade collapsed  by almost two-thirds  in the two years
7of the stabilization. 7 The causes  of the collapse  of terms of trade were both economic  and
political.  Significant  real appreciation  of the  zloty  at the  inception  of the  program  combined  with
trade liberalization  shifted  some  of domestic  food  demand  to inports. But  rolitical  factors  were
probably  more important:  farmers  which  in the previous  regime  had a very strong  lobby  were
able to introduce  the so-called  "parity  policy"  whose  objective  was equalization  of per capita
incomes  in rural  and  urban  areas.  The Communist  iegime,  which  already  faced  strong  workers'
opposition,  thereby  sought  to placate  farmers  in its bid to retain some  social  legitimacy.  With
thc new democratic  goverment, farmers'  political  power waned.  Their  parties  were divided,
and farmers' unhappiness,  manifested  by strikes,  failed to have  much effect. Moreover,  the
leadirg parties in the shaping  of the economic  policy in the Suchocka  government,  namely
Democratic  Union  and Liberal-Democratic  Congress,  are very  much  "anti-farmer".  Holding  that
there  is significant  agricultural  underemployment,  they  are in favor  of forcing  marginal  farmers
out of business.'
The sharp  decline  in incomes  of farmers'  and mixed  households  had the following  effect
on the rankings  of various  social  groups  by their income  levels.  While  throughout  the 1980's,
pensioners'  per capita  incomes  were between  15 and 25 percent  less than the average  incomes
of the other  three active  groups,  in 1992,  for the first  tihzo  since  1978  when  the Surveys  in their
current  shape started,  the ava.rage  income  in pensioners  households  was higher  than average
income  of mixed  and farmers' households;  it also  came  to within  5 percent  of the average  per
capita  income  of workers'  households.
7  As with other  statistics,  the collapse  of terms  of trade  is somewhat  exaggerated.  Input
shortages  which  existed  prior to 1990,  forced  farmers  to purchase  part of inputs  at much  higher
market  prices. These  higher prices were not fully captured  by the statistics.
8  I am grateful  for these  points  to Michnl  Rutkowki.
8The change  in poverty  rates can be expressed  as a function  of two viables:  real per
capita  income,  and income  inequality.  The first variable  is expected  to be negatively,  and the
second,  positively,  related  to poverty.  The  results  for  the per.od  1978-91  are displayed  in 'rable
3. All coeffilcients  are statistically  sigrificant  and  the 2 is around  0.9. The  regression  shows  that
Table 3:  The Determinants  of Poverty.
Dependent  Variable:  Percentage  of the Poor
Constant  Income  Distrib.  R 2 DW
Period  Term  Term  Term  (F)  (SE)
Urban Households  . _
1978-91  384.7**  -50.15**  0.891*  0.88  2.07
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.049)  (56.0)  (3.93)
Rural  Households  _
1  '-978-91  252.2**  -35.25**  1.246**  0.90  1.86
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (74.1)  (2.43)
Notes: Equations  are of the form: POOR =  Bo +  Bl*log(income)  +  B2*distribution.  Autoregression
coefficient  is stat5stically  sgnificant  at less  than I percent  in the first equation.  The number  of observations  is 28. Income
is in 1978  constant  zloty.  Distribution  term is the Gini  coefficient  for oach  social  group. All data are calculated  from the
Household  Surveys  according  to the mothodology  explainod  in footnote  7. Data  in brackets  below  regression  coefficients
show lovels  of significance  at which  the null hypothesis  is rejected.  Two (one) asterisks  show that the coefficient  is
significant  at 1(5)porcent  level.
a ten percent  uniform  (across  all income  groups)  reduction  in real income  of urban and rumal
households  is associated  with respectively  5 and 3.5 percentage  point increase  in the poverty
rate. 9 Thus,  the 30 to 40 percent  reduction  in incomes  recorded  since  the transition  began  led
to 15 to 20 percentage  point increase  in the poverty  rate. Each point increase  in the Gini
9  In order to increase the number of observatior,  the data set for urban population is
composed of  14 annual observations  for  workers and  14 annual observations  for pensioners'
households. The same applies to the rural population  which is composed  of farmers' and mixed
households.
9coefficient  leads to approximately  1 point increase  in the poverty  rate. The implicit  trade-off
between  growth  and  distribution  is therefore  the following.  For  the urban  households  1.8  percent
uniform  real growth  is, from  the  point  of view  of its impact  on poverty,  needed  to offset  1 point
increase  in the Gini coefficient.  For the rural households,  3.5 percent  real growth  is required
for  each  point  increase  in the Gini  coefficient.  Higher  growth-distribution  trade-off  (meaning  that
more growth  is needed  to offset a given increase  in inequality)  for the rural households  is a
reflection  of greater  dispersion  of incomes  among  rural households.  Thus, in order to "push"
enough  people  over the poverty  threshold,  a greater  increase  in real incomes  is needed.
Total estimated  number of the poor in 1990  and 1991  reached  respectively  12 and 13
mnillion  out of a population  of about 38 million  C(able  5).10  Approximately  three-quarters  of
the poor (8.6 million)  live in urban  areas. The average  number  of the poor  in the  previous  three
years (1987-89)  was somewhat  less than 7 million.  It divided  between  urban poor (about  5
million)  and rural poor (2 million). 11 Between  1989 and 1991,  the total number  of the poor
increased  consequently  by about  6 million.  The number  of the poor in urban  areas  went up by
3.5 million  in 1990  alone. The next year, their  number  remained  constant.  The number  of the
rural  poor increased  by over  a million  in 1990,  and  then  by another  million  in 1991.  The  results
clearly  show  that while  in the flrst year of the transition  the brunt  of the social  cost  was borne
by urban households,  and in particular  state-sector  workers,  the bulk of the cost  in the second
year shifted  to farmers  and mixed  households.
Poverty  gap (income  needed  to bring  all poor  households  to the poverty  threshold  level)
almost  tripled  rising from an estimated  3.3 percent of total household  income  in 1989  to 7
percent  in 1990  and to 9 percent  in 1991.  If Survey  data  are expanded  to the whole  population,
the estimated  poverty  gap was approximately  $1.8 billion  or 3.0 percent  of GDP in 1991,  and
$3.6  billion  or 4.6 percent  of GDP  in 1991  (vs. $1.1 billion  or 1.4  percent  of GDP  in 1989).12
10  Total number  of the poor is calculated  by extolating  the poverty rates catculated  from
the Sunreys  to tie whole  population.
'1  See Milanovic  (1992, Table 4).
12  For 1992, this yields a per capita poverty gap of almost $100 per annum.
10For comparison,  in 1991  total expenditures  for the unemployed  amounted  to $700 million  or 0.9
percent of GDP (see Table 4).
Table 4:  Social Transfers in 1991
In $ Billion  As Percent  of GDP
Pensions  9.6  12.3
Various family allowances  2.2  2.8
Other social transfers"  0.6  0.8
Unemployment  benefits  0.7  0.9
Transfers in cash  13.1  16.8
Education  3.3  4.2
Health  3.7  4.7
Transfers  in kind  7.0  8.9
Estimated poverty gap  3.6  4.8
a/ Includes scholarships, social aid given by enterprises, and social assistace  at local level.
Source: Poland StaZstdlo Yearbook 1991, Table 15 (242), p.152, and Table 1 (328), p.  237.
In order to eliminate  the effects of major exchange  rate swings in the beginning of the
transition, it is useful to express poverty gap in real zloty terms. Table 5 nhows  that absolute
poverty gap increased by about 75 percent while the estimated  number of the poor more than
doubled.  The average  real income shortfall  of the people  classified  as poor, therefore decreased.
The year 1990 is particularly interesting in that respect because the relatively low shortfall
clearly  indicates  that many  people  just "slid"  into poverty, falling slightly  below  the poverty line.
Such a decline can socially  be sustainable,  if it is followed,  within a relatively limited  time, by
an increase in income. In that case, the descent into poverty would have been only a transitory
phenomenon.  If this will indeed be the case is impossible  to tell now. The necessary  condition
is that economic  growth resumes. As Table 5 shows, the reverse was the case in 1990  and 1991.
11Read GDP shnmk  by almost  20 percent.  Poverty  gap as share of GDP therefore  expanded
because  both the numerator  and the denominator  moved  in the "wrong"  direction.  Had the
economy  during  these  two years  remained  stagnant,  the same  absolute  poverty  gap would  have
been  equal  to only  3.8 percent  of GDP  instead  of the actual  4.8 percent.
Table  S. Poverty  Gap in Real Terms
Estimated
number  of  Poverty  gap  Poverty  gap
the poor  (1990  prices;  per capita  Real  GDP
(000)  zl billion)  of the poor  (1990  prices)
1989  6,559  12,461  100  100
1990  11,947  17,462  76.9  88.2
1991  12,913  21,574  87.9  81.5
Now: Poverty gap deflatwd  by the rotail pnce indox.
Source: Calculated from Household Surveys. Real GDP from Poland
Stadsfcal  Yea'ook  1992, Table 2 (196), p.118.
We have  seen  in Section  I  that participation  rates  in the state-sector  declined  the most
among  the "standard"  (4- and 5-member)  households.  Among  these households  incidence  of
poverty  increased  most  dramatically  as well.  For example,  between  1989  and 1991,  poverty  rate
for 4-member  households  went  up from 11  to 31 percent;  among  5-member  households,  poverty
increased  from 17 to 43 percent  (Figure  2). The social  implications  of the increase  in poverty
for the typical  household  (husband,  wife and two children)  must  not be overlooked  because  37
percent  of workers'  population  and 25 percent  of the total  population  live in such  households.
In contrast,  poverty  rates  among  1- and  2-person  households  remained  almost  unchanged.  These
rates are determined  chiefly  by pensioners  households  where  the incidence  of poverty  after a
slight  increase  in 1990  returned  to its 1989  level.
Because  the increase  in poverty  was  greater  among  large-size  families,  the change  in the
percentage  of children  who are poor is even greater  than the change  in the percentage  of the
poor households  or the population.  In 1989,  about  17.5  percent  of children  under  6 years  of age
12lived in poor households;  this increased  to more than 50 percent in 1991 (Table  6). Poverty
incidence  among  children  of workers  and mixed  households  tripled. More  than one workers'
child  in two lives  in a poor household.
Poverty  rates  for households
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Table 6:  Estimated  Percentage  of Children Living  In Poverty
1989  1990
Workers  households  19.1  57.9
Mixed  households  10.3  30.4
Farmers  households  20.3  50.9
Total  17.5  51.2
Note: Negligible  percentage  of children  live in pensioners'  households.
13Section  IV. What  Happened  to Income  Distribution?
The  change  in the headcount  ratio  of the poor is, in addition  to the change  in the overall
income,  influenced  by the shape  of the income  distribution  curve (how  bunched  are households
near the poverty  line?),  and by the change  in income  distribution  itself (did it become  more
unequal?).  Between  1989 and 1991, income  distribution,  measured  by the Gini coefficient,
became  slightly  more equal in all social groups except  workers (Table  7). Overall  income
distribution  was  practically  unchanged.  The  increase  in poverty  was  thus  solely  due to declining
incomes.  As  Figure  3 makes  it clear, the whole  distribution  practically  shifted  leftward  between
1989  and 1991,  pushing  an additional  20 percent  of the population  below  the poverty  line.
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The slight  increase  in the Gini  coefficient  among  workers  may  be due to greater wage
differentiation  following  stabilization,  preparations  for the privatization,  and the onset of
industWial  StUcturing.  The Gini coefficient  of state-sector  wages 1 3 also increased,  and there
were some  changes  in returns  to education  and the stnucture  of relative  wages  (see Table  8).
These  conclusions  are necessarily  very tentative  since  the increase  in wage  inequality  is quite
13  Ihis  is the distribution  of all state-sector  wages,  and  represents  a disdinct  (although  Closely
relatod)  variable from  income  inequality  among  workers' households. Ihe latter  includes  all sourcs
of income,  not only  wages,  and is based  on a sample.
14moderate,  and not out of line with what was recorded  before (e.g. in 1986  and 1987 when wage
inequality bounced back from extremely low levels reached during the "Solidarity"  period and
under the martial law).
Table 7: Income Distribution in 1989, 1990 and 1991: Gini Coefficients
1989  1990  1991  Gii  Point
________Change
Workers  23.7  25.0  25.0  +1.3
Mixed households  24.7  23.9  22.2  -2.5
Farmers  35.7  32.5  30.1  -5.6
Pensioners  22.6  20.8  22.3  -0.3
All households  26.0  25.5  24.7  -1.3
State sector wages  19.7  23.6  22.8  +3.1
Note: Distribution of individuals ranked by their  household per capita gross  income. The Gini coefficient
expressed as percentage (e.g. 30 instead of 0.3).  Thi t3ini point change is the change between 1989 and 1991.
Sources: Household Surveys, Poland Statiavcal Yearbooks (for the distribution of state sector wages).
The ratio between wages of highly-skilled  and medium-skilled  workers also increased:
in 1990, the ratio between these two categories  was 1.35 to 1 while it was 1.16 to 1 in 1988.14
A similar  process of increased  returns to skills  and education  is noted by Gorecki  and Peczowski
(1992, Figure 2). They point out that the average income of households  headed by university
graduates was in 1990 about 25 percent higher that the average income of households  headed
by people with primary or vocational schonl. In 1988, for example, the average incomes were
equal. This has produced a higher share of skilled  individuals  in top income groups. While in
1989, households  headed  by university  and secondary-school  graduates  accounted  for 43 percent
14  Polwnd Sta&sicdl  Yearbook 1991, Table 7 (324), p.  234. The datum for 1988 is quoted in
(Freeman. 1992:14).
15of households  in the highest income decile, two years later their share increased to almost 66
percent. 1s
More evidence  on the changing  wage  distribution  is obtained  by looking  at relative wages
of different occupations. Such comparison is fraught with problems because the occupational
structure  presented  for 1990  does not fully coincide with the occupational  structure  available  for
1986 and 1987.16  What can, nevertheless, be concluded from Table 8 is a decline of relative
wages for miners, routine accountants  and economists,  and some  categories  of manual workers
(textile workers). In the previous system, miners occupied a very special position, for both
ideological  reasons (miner was the prototype of a socialist  worker) and more pragmatic foreign
exchange  needs (Poland  relied heavily on coal exports). That position was bound to end in the
transition. Decline  in relative wages  of routine accountants  and economists  may be an indication
of the deterioration of  relative wages of the bulk of middle-level  clerical personnel whose
numbers were overblown  in the socialist system. As demand for clerical staff decreases, their
relative wages go down. Better or luckier among them may eventually move to positions of
management specialists (such an  occupation did  not exist in  the  1986-87 classification).
Generally, however, the relative  position of manual workers, with the exception  of miners, did
not change much.
Resemblance  between the 1986 and 1987 wage structures is much greater (correlation
coefficient  almost equal to unity) than among  these two years and 1990 (r=0.85  and 0.8).
Private sector wage structure (not reported here) is probably closer to that existing in
market economies.  Very high wages received by some  occupations  (business  school graduates,
auditors, some economists)  provide a lot of anecdotal  evidence that wage distribution must be
widening.  For example, government  administration  is outbid by local and foreign firms that are
often able to hire its best people.
1s  Quoted from Gorecki (1992, Table 7).
"  Data for 1991 ate not published.
16Table 8:  Relative  Wages  by Occupation  in State Sector
(average  wage  for all state sector workers =  1)
1986  1987  1990
Mining  engineer  n.a.  n.a.  2.42
Management  specialist  n.a.  n.a.  1.74
Miner  2.15  3.21  1.60
Geologist/engineer  0.98  1.02  1.35
4Accountant/economist  1.15  1.28  1.06
Electrician  0.88  1.02  1.06
Welder  1.00  1.15  1.00
Locksmith  0.94  1.04  1.00
Bricklayer  0.79  0.89  0.91
Weaver (textiles)  0.84  0.95  0.78
Cashier/shop  assistant  0.60  0.68  0.66
Correlation  coefficients  0.99  1  0.85  0.80 
Soume: Poland 8rad sdcaI  Yearbook 1991, Table 10(327), p.235, and Po6  andfStadical  Yearbook  1988, Tables
7C224)  and 8225):162-3.
Section  V. Did Welfare Really  Decrease?
An important  question  is whether  the welfare,  on average,  has declined  or not following
the introduction  of market-oriented  reforms.  Particularly  relevant  for such  an analysis  is the first
year of the stabilization  (1990)  when,  as indicated  above,  both  the supporters  and  the opponents
of the reform  were suiprised  by the extent  of the decline  of incomes,  industrial  production  and
GDP. The extremely  severe  decline  was taken  by some  as an argument  that the "Big bang"
market-  oriented  reforms  cause  a lot, and it is argued,  some  probably  unnecessary,  hardship.  On
17the other hand,  pardsans  of the "Big  bang" approach  contend  that theie is a cumber  of data
biases which  lead  to an exaggerated  view of the hardships.
Lipton  and Sachs  (1990)  argument  is emblematic  of this second  strand  of thought.  They
argue  that earlier  statistics  had an in-built  bias  toward  presenting  a rosier  picture  of the reality
and that once  this bias is eliminated,  as it happens  during  the transition,  the new situation  by
contrast  appears  worse.  Measuring  of output  was geared  to take  account  of physical  quantities
which  made  sense  in a planned  economy  but not in a market  economy  where many  of these
goods  are not wanted.  Lipton  and Sachs  (1990:79)  quote  a Polish  joumnalist  who writes: "For
the entire  period  of real socialism,  investments  were  poured  into a closed  production  cycle  that
offered  no profit:  coal  was  necessary  to produce  electricity;  electricity  was  necessary  to produce
steel;  and steel  was necessary  to mine coal. All that produced  a statistical  growth  in national
income,  a growth  which,  as we now  see, actually  meant  a decline  in national  wealth."
State production  alone was recorded  in statistics;  production  of small private-owned
enterprises  was  often  unrecorded.  This was  not a problem  so long  as these  entexprises'  share  in
value  added  was negligible.  But during  the transition  their importance  rises rapidly.  Hence,  it
is argued,  underestimation  of some  output  gains. Finally,  one of the most visible  aspects  of
stabilization  in Poland and elsewhere  has been a dramatic  increase  in trading. Often, on
extremely  small  scale,  used  as a complement  to jobs in state  enterprises,  alegal  if not illegal,
private  trading  was almost  entirely  bypassed  by official  statisticians.
All of these  are reasons  wny the reported  declines  in output  may look worse  than they
are in reality.  Lipton  and Sachs  (1990),  however,  make  a more  ambitious  attempt  to show  that
utility  of an average  consumer  might have gone up (even  if his income  appears  to be less)
18because of the disappearance  of excess demand and consequent  waiting that imposes real cost
in terms of resources (time) spent. I shall first present their argument and then point to some
problems  with their claim.
Lipton and Sachs (1990)  define  excess demand  as a situation  when aggregate  demand (Y)
excess aggregate supply (S) at the official -price  level (P) which for simplicity we can set at
unity. Percentage excess demand (ea) is equal to (Y-S)IY. Aggregate demand and supply are
equilibrated  through the mechanism of black market. At the black market price Pb (Pb> 1),
aggregate demand and supply are equal: S Pb= Y.
If we replace the last relation into the previous equation  for ex we obtain:
ex=  S(Pb -1)  =  Pb-l  (1)
Pb s  Pb-
Representative  consumer's utility is equal to U= U(S) + wL, where S=real consumption
equal to aggregate supply, w=exogenous marginal utility of leisure, and L=the  amount of
leisure. Also, leisure L is reduced by the amount of time the consumer must spend in waiting
lines. Let us denote time spent queuing per unit of output as q.  Then the utility equation
becomes U=S + w (N- qS) where N=maximum amount of leisure if q=O, and, for simplicity,
we assume direct proportionality  between consumption  and utlity  so that U(S) =S.
Utlity  from spending a unit of time queAing  must, in equilibrium, be equal to the
marginal utility of leisure: 17
I?  Note that the implicit assumption  is that the marginal  and average utility from queuing  are
the same, i.e. that the marginal  utility does not decrease.
19w - U(I,)  - U  Pb - 11i  Pb -1  (2)
q  J  q
where T  = profit per unit of queuing (Pb-I is the monetary gain, that is the difference  between
the market and official price of output), and, again, for simplicity we assume proportionality
between utility and monetary return, w. In Lipton and Sachs (1990) equation (2) is divided
throughout  by Pb. This, however, is incorrect since the same deflation  would either have to be
done consistently  (e.g. for w) or not done at all, thus implicitly  assuming that the deflator is 1
as we are doing here. The mistake though does not affect the rest of the derivations.
From (2) it follows that Pb-l =qw. Replacing  this into (1) yields:
Pb-1  qw  (3)
Pb  Pb
From (3), q=Pb(exlw) which, when if w=constant, shows  that  queuingper unit of output
is proportional  to excess demand  and to the excess of black market price over the official  price.
Finally, we can substitute  q=Pb(exlw) in the utility equation  to obtain:
U  - S + w (N-qS)  = S  + w (N - Pb  xST  =  S (1 - Pb =)  + wN  (4) w
which is the final expression  obtained  by Lipton  and Sachs (except for Pb which is canceled
out in their derivation). They write: "when the system is characterized by excess demand,
increases in real income lead to decreases  in utility" (1990:92). That statement  as well as their
Figure 1 (1990:93), implicitly assume that S is constant. If it were the case, obviously, the
greater the excess demand (ex) the less the utility because more time is spent in  "directly
20unproductive"  waiting. 1'
However, what characterized  Polish stabilization  was a declne in S and utility in equation
(4) must then decrease on account of lower S (BY/8S>O).  According to official statistics the
decline in S per capita was 13.5 percent. Even according to Berg and Sachs (1992-141),  who
strongly dispute the official statistics, real consumption decreased by 4.8 percent. Indeed,
household  surveys show that per capita consumption  of most food items decreased (see Table
9).19
The decline in S was moderated, however, by a marked increase in ownership of, and
thus utility derived from, some  products that are almost  entirely imported (e.g. video recorders,
color TVs; see Table 9). If consumption is divided into two parts Sd  =  domestic consumer
output and M  =  consumer  imports, there was an increase in consumption  of M both in terms
of physical quantities of goods (mostly consumer durables) and non-factor services (foreign
tourism). Increase in M was due to real appreciation  of the exchange  rate and increase in dollar
wages. The fact that Polish dollar wages went up does not matter for that part of consumption
that is used to buy domestic outputF°  because the purchasing power of the dollar in terms of
domestic  commodities  has gone down by even more. It is relevant, however, for import demand
because an average Polish worker, whose wage increased from $39 in 1989 (estimated  at the
18  Pb is also a fimction  of ex and need not be discussed  separately.
'9  The same results are obtained if one uses the macro consumption  data divided by the
population. We prefer to use survey data to avoid the charge made at the macro data, namely that
they miss some of the retail trade.
10  Sachs  (1990:8) seems  to imply  this but is rightly criticized  by Secretariat  of the Economic
Commission  for Europe (1992: 54).
21Table  9:  Food Consumption and Ownership of Durables Among
Workers'  Households
Per Capita Per Month  1989  1990  % Change
Meats (kg)  2.81  2.71  -3.6
Butter (kg)  0.73  0.73  0
Milk (1)  7.26.  6.78  -6.6
Cheese (kg)  0.92  0.76  -17.4
Eggs (pieces)  15.82  14.45  -8.7
Sugar (kg)  2.06  1.92  -6.8
Total Calories Per Day  2542  2408  -S.3
Percentage of Households  with:  _  ____  _
Color TVs  50.7  67.1  +16.4
Video-recorders  4.7  20.1  + 15.4
Washing machines  59.1  63.5  +4.4
Cars  30.7  33.2  +2.5
Note: For consumer  durables  the data show  percentage  point  increases  in ownership.
Sources: Stadsdcal  Yearbook 1991 Tables 25(313), 27(315) and 28(316); SAZ*dcal Yearbook 1990 Tables
26(322)  and 30(326).
1989 parallel rate) to $108 in 1990 did feel richer and indeed increased his or her consumption
of importables. This is a feature common  to many stabilization  problems: instant  prosperity can
be created through real appreciation  of the exchange  rate. The obvious examples  are Chile in
the mid eighties, Peru under the Garcia government  in 1985-87,  and former Yugoslavia  during
the Markovic progrm  in 1990. The problem is whether such a rate can be sustained. Most
often, barring continuation  of substantial  inflows on the capital account, it cannot. The Polish
situation, from the point of policy-makers, was better. Persistent excess demand and lack of
alternative financial instruments  created a lastng  high demand for foreign exchange. Foieign
exchange  market was the n-th market that equilibrated  aggregate  demand  and supply. Zloty was
22thus chronically  undervalued. Unification of the exchange rate in January 1990 permitted to
poLicy-makers  to provide "instant prosperity" at an exchange: ate that was basically  correct.
How the decline  in real Incomes  and consumption  of the essentials  can be reconciled with
an increase in consumption  of imported  consumer durables is shown in Figures 4a and 4b. As
before, suppose  that total personal consumption  is composed  of Sd domestically  produced  goods
and M imported consumer  durables. Since the system is demand-driven,  demand automatically
determines  the supply. For simplicity  we also assume  that all of Sd are the essentials  (e.g. food)
and all of M are consumer  durables.
Figure 4a shows the downward  shift of domestic demand from DDo  to DD, due to the
decline in real income (Y, <YO). In  addition, the demand shifts downward because of the
negative wealth effect (Wl <WO). The population, in effect, experienced capital loss on their
foreign exchange savings as the unification of t  , official and paallel  market rate in January
1990 produced an important real apprecation of  the parallel rate at which exchange rate
holdings  were previously valued. The upper bound of the population  capital loss, calculated  on
the assumption that all of foreign exchange was to  be used to  buy domestic products, 21 is
estimated at some 4 percent of GDP. 22 Alternatively, if the population intended to use all of
its foreign exchange savings to buy imports, its wealth was not affected. An intermediate
situation  is the most likely: thus capital loss probably amounted  to between 1 and 3 percentage
points of  GDP and  must have, through the reverse Pigou effect that dampened personal
consumption. As Table 10 shows, total real money, including zloty and foreign exchange
savings, held by the population  declined  by 22.6 percent in 1990. The decline was entirely due
to the capital loss (measured  in zloty terms) on foreign exchange holdings: foreign exchange
21  For example,  many  people were saving  foreign  exchange  to buy  apartn'ents  in Poland. They
lost substantial amounts as purchasing power of the dollar plummeted  and dollar price of the
apartments  increased  (independently  of the increase in price of apartments due to higher demand
from foreign  companies).
22  Foreign  exchange  deposits  in Polish  banks  were $6.3 billion  in December  1989.  Two-thirds
of that  amount  was owned  by the population.  It was estimated  that, in addition,  between  one and two
billion wore kept at home (Krzykidewicz,  1989: 29)). Betweon  January 1990  and Decembor  1990,
prce level increased  95 percent while the parallel exchange  rate (now equal  to the official)  devalued
by about 4 percent. Real loss to foreign  exchange  holders (measured  in domestic  currency)  was thus
between  $3.3 billion  and $3.8 billion (about 6 percent of GDP). Two-thirds  of the loss was borne
by the population.
23holdings went down by 50 percent. The relative price  of  Sd  (food) in  Figure 4a  stayed
practically unchanged,3 and the population  ended up buying quantity Q, of food in 1990. The
difference  Q1-Q 0 reflects the decline in Sd that is revealed in the Surveys.
Table 10:  Money Holdings of the Population
(end of year; billion zloty unless otherwise specified)
Change
1989  1990  (%)
Cash zloty  8899.6  36954.9  l
Zloty saving  deposits  8629.0  40536.8 l
Total nominal  zloty holdings  17328.6  77491.7  l
(1)  Real zloty holdings  17328.6  22203.9  +28.1
Foreign exchange savings (FX)  32025.7  55749.4  l
(2) FX  in  real  terms  32025.7  15974.0  -50.1
(1) +  (2) Total real money  49354.3  38177.9  -22.6
FEX in dollar terms (billion)  4.2  5.7  +35.7
Soure:  Poland Sfatscal  Yearbook 1991, Table 23(250), p.157 .
Note  Foreign exchange dollar amounts converted in zloty at the parallel
exchange rate. Real amounts in 1989 prices.
Figure 4b shows  the situation  on the import side. Population  foreign exchange  holdings
(weaklh)  remained  the same in dollar terms immediately  after the unification  of the parallel and
official exchange rate. (Considered  over the whole year, dollar deposits increased from $4.2
billion to $5.7 billion; see Table 10.) However, zloty appreciation  raised domestic  dollar wages
substantially  (they almost  trpled) and thus population  income expressed  in dollars (y 1> yo)  went
up shifting  in the process the demand curve for imports from DM 0 to DM 1. Dollar prices of
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25imports remained unchanged and the consumption  of importables  went up from qo to ql. This
is why we observe much greater ownership  of consumer durables in the Surveys.
This explains why the two components  of S have moved  in different directions. Since we
ignore the shape of  the utility function we cannot determine relative importance of partial
derivatives of U with respect to Sd, M and ex. However, in addition to these variables, other
variables in (4) also changed. w represents the real wage rate (=opportunity cost of leisure).
Real wage declined in 1990 (even if one may dispute the exact amount of the decline).'  This
further reduces utility as  the gain from the elimination of  excess demand is  lowered: if
opportunity cost of leisure is less, people do not mind as much waiting in line. Finally, N
probably increased (on the account of increased unemployment).  This, of course, raises utility
(people work less). However, if, for simplicity, we allow that the effects of w and N are too
small and uncertain, we can take a reduced utility function of the form U= U(S,q) where the
effect of reduction of S probably dominates  the effect of lower q.
The above analysis deals with the representative consumer. It thus fails to take into
account  the issues of distribution.  If elimination  of subsidies  and excess  demand (1) affects lower
income households more than higher income households (note that their opportunity cost of
queuing is less and that, according to all empirical studies, subsidies  are pro-poor)';  and (2)
21  Real wage should be measured  as nominul  wage divided  by Pb.
25  For Poland, it is calculated  that inclusion  of consumer  subsidies  reduces  income inequality,
measured  by the Gini coefficient,  from 21.8 to 20.0. Kupa and Fajth (1990: 37) similarly find for
Hungary that the Gini coefficient is reduced from 23.1 (for disposable income) to 22.0 (for
disposable income plus subsidies). Finally, for CSFR evidence points to the sae  conclusion:
negative tunover  tax  (a  type  of  consumer subsidy) represents 7.1  percent of  households'
expenditures  in the lowest  and 4.4 percent in the highest  income decile  (World  Bank, 1991:59). On
the basis of household  expenditure  surveys, Ve6ernik  (1991: 17) calculates that lowest quartile  of
households  received per capita 7.5 pecent  more food subsidies than the average while the top
quartile received 6.1 percent less than the average. Similar results were obtaned  for  Algeria
(Stanova  ..  :'991: 41). Subsidies  are thus pro-poor  in relative  terms, meaning  that they account for
a greater proportion of poor households  income or expenditures,  but are not normally  pro-poor in
absolute  terms, meaning  that the poor receive more from subsidies  in absolue value. (The  implicit
assumption  is that households  with different incomes  pay the same average price for the subsidized
good. In other words, the percentages of consumption  at subsidized and free-market price are
independent  of the level of income).
26marginal utility of income decreases  with the level of income, then the overall utility must have
been depressed even further.
In conclusion, we can write the representative  consumer  utility function as follows:
U =  U (Sd, M, q, w,  N  (5)
where all the symbols  are as explained  before. (Note  that the change  in wealth  is left out because
it affects utility only indirectly through its effec::  on real consumption:  people consume less
because they feel poorer.)
Consumer utility in  1990 decreased on account of reduction in Sd. The decline, was
moderated  by the elimination  of queuing and increased  consumption  of importables  (A). What
the balance of these effects is,  is impossible to determine. What is sure,  however, is that
observing only S, implicitly assumes that the utility function is U= U(S) which is incorrect.
Lipton and Sachs' (1990) contr5bution  therefore consists in  bringing in  another important
element, namely q. However, they fail to acknowledge  the fact that S decreased (an important
omission)  and that at least two other elements  changed as well: wage rate declined and thus the
opportunity  cost of waiting was reduced, and total leisure increased.
27Conclusions
The effects of  the  Polish stabilization program  implemented in  1990 generated a
widespread discussion. The discussion was motivated by the unexpectedly high social costs
associated  with transition to capitalism. The often unstated assumption at the inception of the
stabilization  program was that since centmal  planning was intrinsically inefficient, stabilization
in Poland may even be less costly in terms of lost output than in market economies.  According
to these views, recession stemming from the overall decline in demand could be moderated
thanks to the removal of administrative  barriers that hindered a better deployment  of resources
in a planned economy. In the event, the results were rather the reverse. Population welfare
declined as unemployment  reached 12 percent of labor force by the end of 1991 while real
incomes plummeted (by about 40 percent per capita). Poverty increased from an estimated 17
percent of the population  in 1989  to 34 percent in 1991. Poverty rate more than doubled in all
social  groups except  among  pensioners  where  it remained  stable. Larger households  and children
in particular were affected. The estimated  poverty gap rose from 1.4 to 4.8 percent of GDP. The
existing evidence on income distribution shows that it did not change; there was some slight
compression  among farmers which occurred also in the past whenever  real incomes declined,
and some possible wage-stretchiwg  among workers. What happened to the overall welfare?
Conclusive  results are difficult  to obtain. While overall personal consumption  decreased,  utility
derived from increased ownership  of consumer  durables (imperfectly  covered by the statistics)
increased; while queuing decreased,  utility gains from shorter lines were lessened  as real wages
and thus the opportunity cost of waiting declined; real appreciation  of the exchange rate that
raised dollar wages substantially  and led to an upsurge of consumer imports inflicted a capital
loss on domestic holders of foreign exchange; total leisure increased on the account of higher
unemployment  but anxiety and uncertainty  went up as well.
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